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This article is dedicated to the problems 
of deployment of the US anti-missile defence 
system in Eastern Europe. The European 
system of US missile defence is just one of 
the components of global US missile 
defence. This work aims to analyze possible 
Russia’s responses within military and 
political spheres. The measures proposed 
are divided into three subgroups: soft, 
medium and hard depending on the 
implementation of the adopted missile 
defence concept by the USA. This research 
employs the structure-system method and the 
method of actualization. The authors outline 
both positive and negative consequences of 
such actions for the Russian Federation, the 
USA, eastern European countries and the 
neighbouring countries, including the Baltic 
Sea states. The practical significance of this 
study consists in the proposed and justified 
responses of the Russian Federation that 
may serve as a basis for the scenarios of 
development of international situation and 
help to forecast the level of tension in 
Russia-US relations. 
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The idea of creation of a new anti-mis-
sile defence concept voiced by President 
George W. Bush in 2001 [19] and the con-
cept of US missile defence deployment in 
Eastern Europe presented by the Presiden-
tial Administration in January 2006 [15] 
caused severe criticism from the Russian 
Federation and its alliance partners. 
Despite the constant statements of 
the US Presidential Administration that 
the deployment of AA radars and an 
anti-missile defence system in Eastern 
Europe is by no means a move against 
the Russian Federation, Russia’s gov-
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ernment believes that the USA pursues the above-mentioned goal. The 
defence concept aims to create “the system of non-nuclear means de-
signed to counter ballistic missiles of all ranges — short, medium, interme-
diate and long” [15, p. 2]. The new anti-ballistic missile defence system 
(ABM) was originally planned to have the form of a triangle with one 
angle situated is Eastern Europe and two others in the USA — in Alaska 
(Fort Greely) and in California (Vanderberg). Anti-ballistic missile de-
fence components would destroy hostile warheads in the terminal phase 
with the Patriot AD Weapon System. Missile defence facilities deployed 
in Eastern Europe would be employed for target detection and destroying 
of ballistic missiles at the ascent and midcourse stages. Space tracking 
and surveillance system should destroy warheads in the midcourse phase 
[10]. After Barack Obama and his Administration came to power in 2009, 
the initial plans of George W. Bush were reconsidered and adjusted. They 
then provided a basis for the new European NATO Deployment Concept 
which should be implemented in four stages. The US ABM is to be put 
into full operational service in 2018 but starts to operate as early as May 
2012 [11]. 
In this connection the Russian Federation is ready to take any possible 
steps to prevent the escalation of threats to its international security. The 
range of these steps depends on the actions of the USA on the deployment 
concept implementation. 
In the given case all possible Russian measures in response to the im-
plementation of the US missile defence deployment concept can be grouped 
according to two spheres — political and military (Tables 1 and 2). 
Political measures are soft, medium and hard, and aimed at developing 
an alternative to ABM or creating an alliance with Russia’s partner-countries 
as well as ensuring legality of Russian response to the threat from the Third 
Site countries.  
Military measures provide security to the RF, and are aimed at the de-
velopment of a collateral defence system and the upgrading of aerospace de-
fence capacity of the Russian Army. 
Continued talks and negotiations with the US Administration on inad-
missibility of the ABM defence system deployment in Eastern Europe. For 
better results it is recommended to create a working group that would in-
clude, among others: the specialists who had developed the ABM defence of 
the USSR and the Russian Federation; the developers of the ABM Treaty of 
1972; representatives of the Russian Security Council (the Minister of De-
fence, Directors of External and Internal Intelligence Services; Chief of De-
fence of the Russian Military, first deputy Minister of Defence, President of 
the Russian Academy of Science); specialists from the Russian Space Forces 
(commanding officers of the Space Forces and operative commanding offi-
cers of the aerospace defence; head of the Main Centre of Missile Attack 
Warning; commanding officer of ABM division); representatives of the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs (Minister of Foreign Affairs, one of their Deputies, 
heads of North American Department, and Security and Disarmament De-






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I. å. Lyovkin, V. I. Shatskaya 
 37
This working group should concentrate on fulfilling the following objec-
tives: 
1. Development of negotiation proposals on a number of topics, includ-
ing, but not limited to: utilization of already existing US and RF ABM de-
fence systems (radar stations in Gabala, etc.), joint participation of the US 
and Russia in the development of ABM defence. 
2. Discussing counter-offers proposed by the US Administration and/or 
Working Group. 
3. Discussing issues arising from the conflicting views of the parties. 
4. Keeping the public informed about the negotiations. 
5. Evaluation of existing and perspective US and Russian ABM defence 
systems, forecasting of the outcomes of agreements between Russia and the 
US and of US ABM defence deployment in Eastern Europe (for Russia). 
6. Development of recommendations for military and political leader-
ship of the Russian Federation. 
7. Drawing up necessary documents to conduct high-level talks. 
8. Drawing up a possible strategic paper on the antiballistic missile de-
fence of the Russian Federation (e. g. Strategic Development of ABM De-
fence of Russian Federation until 2025). 
9. Developing alternative ways of cooperation between Russia and the 
US regarding ABM defence. 
Developing proposals on a new ABM treaty between Russia and the 
United States. If a joint ABM system is developed, the new treaty should 
include obligatory clauses defining joint efforts of both countries in this 
area. 
Developing proposals on the new ABM treaty with the USA drawing on 
the positive experience of the USSR-USA ABM Treaty of 1972. The follow-
ing provisions (on the agreement of parties) should be included in the treaty: 
Each Party undertakes 
1. not to give missiles, missile systems, surface-mobile ABM defence 
systems, seaborne multifunctional combat information control systems, long- 
and medium-range ABM interceptor missiles and other elements and com-
ponents of ABM system, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or 
their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; 
2. not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor 
missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic 
ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in 
an ABM mode; 
3. not to create, test or deploy the ABM system or its components on its 
land, air, space and surface-mobile bases, excluding those already deployed 
or in the process of deployment; 
4. not to create, test or deploy ABM launchers capable of launching 
more than one ABM at a time; not to modify already deployed launchers to 
give them such capability; and not to create, test or deploy automatic or self-
loading devices designed to speedily reload missile launchers; 
5. to keep the existing ABM systems under certain conditions (determine 
the conditions of conservation of the ABM system during additional talks or 
keep the conditions of 1972). 
International relations 
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Conducting international hearings (in the EU, SCO, CIS, Disarmament 
Committee of UN General Assembly, CSTO, EurAsEC) on disarmament and 
missile defence issue with compulsory achievement of joint political agree-
ment. Already on the 15th of June 2011, during the anniversary SCO summit 
in Astana, the participants of the summit adopted the Astana Declaration, in 
which the leaders of the SCO states (Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan and Kirgizia) have condemned US plans of global ABM defence 
system deployment: «The member states believe that the unilateral and unre-
stricted build-up of a missile defence capability by one state or a group of 
countries can hurt strategic stability and international security» [9]. In his in-
terview, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, said that 
the criticism is directed not only against the deployment of Euro-ABM, but 
against the “global ABM system that is being deployed by the USA all over 
the world, even in South-East Asia” [17]. 
Conducting negotiations with Iran on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
materials in military purposes, and on the inadmissibility of development of 
long-range nuclear missiles, on the possibility of further IAEA control over 
the nuclear programme implemented by Iran, on the necessity to fight nu-
clear terrorism and on the necessity to control the spread of missile tech-
nologies and to join the Missile Technology Control Regime. 
Coordinating the ABM defence issue with the key issues of disarmament 
and non-proliferation across the world and in Europe will complement the 
already existing political measures. The possibility to refuse further disar-
mament and non-proliferation, and the possibility of Russian exit from the 
SNF-3 Treaty (Nov 23, 2011) was underlined by the President of the Russian 
Federation in his statement on the Euro-ABM deployment in Europe [5]. 
Convincing Eastern European Countries (Romania, Poland and Czech 
Republic) that there is a possibility of the following negative effects of the 
US ABM defence system deployment (to be achieved through public media, 
diplomatic, private and political channels of influence): 
— cooling down in political and economic relationships with Russia; 
— cooling down of relationships with the states involved in the nuclear 
debate; 
— discord within the EU, change of EU authority and introduction of 
new Members; 
— emergence of strategic secret objects that will disrupt the relaxed 
European lifestyle; 
— increased US military contingent in the Third Site states; 
— involvement in the arms race between the USA and Russia with pos-
sible additions of third countries; 
— destruction of targets, including missile attacks, in their territory; 
— radioactive poisoning of the territory after such attacks. 
We also call for support (media and financial support) of NGOs, unions, 
influential individuals who used to take prominent positions in the govern-
ments of Third Site countries, public intellectuals, and regular citizens who 
wish to protest the ABM deployment plans. Since some of the Eastern Euro-
pean countries also lie in Central Europe (Poland, Romania, Czech Repub-
lic), their general attitude and reaction can greatly influence the geopolitical 
situation, preferably in the interests of Russian Federation. 
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Introduction of the stipulation on possibility of a preventive strike (pos-
sibly with battle field nuclear weapons) on the objects of the 3rd missile 
launching area of the US ABM Defence into the Russian Federation Military 
Doctrine. At present The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation ap-
proved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict on 5 February 2010, re-
serves the right for Russia “to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the 
utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against 
it and (or) its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian 
Federation involving the use of conventional weapons when the very exis-
tence of the state is under threat” [3]. Thereat among the main external mili-
tary threats it counts “the desire to endow the force potential of the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with global functions carried out in vio-
lation of the norms of international law and to move the military infra-
structure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian 
Federation, including by expanding the bloc”, as well as “the creation and 
deployment of strategic missile defence systems undermining global stability 
and violating the established correlation of forces in the nuclear-missile 
sphere, and also the militarization of outer space and the deployment of stra-
tegic nonnuclear precision weapon systems”[3]. At the same time, “the Rus-
sian Federation's military policy is aimed at preventing an arms race, deter-
ring and preventing military conflicts, and improving <…> means of attack 
for the purpose of defending and safeguarding the security of the Russian 
Federation and also the interests of its allies” [3]. Besides, Russia’s para-
mount task is preventing a nuclear military conflict, and among the main 
goals in preventing and deterring military conflicts it holds “creating mecha-
nisms for the regulation of bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the 
sphere of missile defence” [3]. 
Seeking coalition with states holding similar views on the 3rd missile 
launching area of the US ABM Defence (China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Ta-
jikistan, Kyrgyzstan) and cooperation at the international scene. Extending 
the coalition is possible through states that hold neutral (or indifferent) views 
on the said question or who have not yet defined their views. On October 4, 
2011 it was reported that Russia and the Ukraine held negotiations on the 
cooperative missile shield system [16]. Head of the Ukrainian Mission in 
NATO, Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary Igor Dolgov said that 
the Ukraine would participate in the NATO ABM Defence only if Russia 
joined it [18]. 
Depending on the political situation the policies also include Russia’s 
dismissal, consent or partial consent with the US proposals concerning the 
ABM. 
Development of the military technical proposals to create an alternation 
ABM variant with the Russian Federation Armed Forces taking the lead: 
— the US ABM system utilizing information from Russian missile at-
tack warning facilities (the radar locator station in Gabala (Azerbaijan) and 
other areas) on the situation with possible nuclear missile attack forces; 
— deployment of the Russian Federation ABM system aerospace target 




— forming a joined interface for the information management systems 
of Russia and the US ABM Defence. 
At the Lisbon Summit that took place in November 2010 Russia and the 
US agreed to continue discussing future cooperation on ABM Defence. Rus-
sia proposed to create a sectoral ABM defence system, according to which 
missiles that would fly over Russia towards NATO members would be ex-
terminated by the Russian forces. In its turn NATO must destroy missiles 
traversing territories of NATO members and aimed at Russian facilities. Be-
sides, the parties will not aim their ABM facilities at each other and deploy 
them at the shared borders [4]. However, at the meeting of the Russian 
President with NATO administration held in July 2011 in Sochi and the visit 
of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov in Washington this 
idea was rejected. And at the Russia — NATO Council session held on De-
cember 8, 2011 the parties did not achieve any progress on this issue. The 
next NATO summit session will take place in May 2012 in Chicago. Its re-
sults may define the international situation. 
Constant monitoring by extraterritorial surveillance facilities (space fa-
cilities for Earth’s remote probing, like “Resurs-DK”) of the Third Site of the 
US ABM Defence system facilities, both functioning as well as being under 
construction), and updating their location and creating their 2D images to in-
put into the fire weapons guidance system. “Resurs-DK” makes it possible to 
obtain detailed images of the facilities and transmit the information through a 
radio channel to the Earth. 
Precluding supplies of equipment and technologies for manufacturing 
nuclear missile weapons in the third countries. Russia may join in sanctions 
against Iran and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and discontinue its 
peaceful programme. 
Deployment of means of destruction (short-range missiles “Iskander”) 
within reach of the 3rd missile launching area of the US ABM Defence sys-
tem (Kaliningrad region, Russian Federation regions bordering on the Third 
Site) that will not demand any substantial expenses and will take the form of 
an asymmetrical response. In 2008 in his first Address to the Federal As-
sembly the Russian President announced a possibility of installing “Is-
kander” missiles in the Kaliningrad region if need there be [13]. On the 23rd 
of November, 2011 Dmitry Medvedev in his special address to the citizens 
of the Russian Federation confirmed the intention to deploy the “Iskander” 
missile complex in the Kaliningrad region and strike systems in the western 
and southern areas of Russia if necessary [5]. The Russian President’s alle-
gation to deploy operational “Iskander” and making radar locator stations in 
Kaliningrad operational provoked a negative response from the Baltic States. 
Lithuanian Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius reassured Russia of NATO 
ABM Defence system not being targeted at Russia and mentioned that “it 
must be taken seriously, but… to assure Russia that it should not act so bel-
ligerently, we must… together with the NATO partners”[14]. At the same 
time “Latvian Defence Minister Artis Pabriks asked the authorities of the 
Latvian National Defence Forces to estimate Medvedev words “from the 
standpoint of the military threat” [14]. 
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Research and Development of new means of destruction (suppression) of 
the Third Site facilities (for example, precision weapons, radioelectronic 
countermeasures means, aerospace jamming etc.). This will probably require 
introducing corrections into the Government military contract. In 2009—
2010 the Ministry of Defence already contracted research and development 
works on the creation of complex specimens for the Strategic Missile Forces 
and Aerospace Forces; these works can be financed from the military spend-
ing budget under the Federal Armament Programme for 2011—2020 [2]. In 
the above-mentioned Presidential Address (Nov. 23, 2011), Dmitry Medvedev 
tasked the Military Forces of the Russian Federation with “developing measures 
ensuring the destruction of control and information-transfer system within the 
ABM defence, should such need ever arise” [5]. 
Further development of the Russian aerospace defence system (data 
transmission and strike capacity, methods and forms of overcoming ABM, 
etc.) within the framework of the new strategic partnership between the Rus-
sian Military Forces and its Aerospace Forces. As of December, 2011, the 
troops of the new Aerospace Defence Forces, created in accordance with the 
Presidential decree, took up their duty. Shortly before that, another Presiden-
tial decree (of Nov.29th, 2011) introduced the system of missile attack detec-
tion, a radar location station “Voronezh DM” into the military facilities of the 
Kaliningrad region [6]. According to Dmitry Medvedev, Aerospace Forces 
will help to increase the protection of strategic nuclear objects [5]. “From the 
military and geopolitical standpoint, the aerospace defence is a valuable tool of 
keeping geopolitical balance in the modern world. From the strategic stand-
point, it is the main guarantee of ensuring that the President of Russian Fed-
eration — and Supreme Commander-in-Chief — receives correct and relevant 
information about the airspace situation and is thus able to make strategic de-
cisions” [8, с. 46]. 
Development of new means to overcome the ABM defence of the USA, of 
the forms and technologies of their combat applications. “Bulava ICBM”, 
for example, carried by the nuclear submarines, has the launching radius of 
8000 km, and its main advantage is that it contains individual nuclear ma-
neuvering homing devices that are able to change the height and trajectory of 
the flight [1]. In his November Address, Dmitry Medvedev underlined that the 
strategic nuclear missile available to the Russian Military Forces and Strategic 
Missile Forces “will be equipped with the top means of overcoming ABM de-
fence and with new, highly efficient warheads” [5]. 
In this article we propose a number of development scenarios for Rus-
sian response to the ABM system deployment — each of those scenarios can 
be triggered and put into action depending on the actual steps implemented 
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